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Abstract
There has been a long tradition of presumed perfect mobility in urban
economics. Workers switch their locations in direct response to differences
in local economic performance. Recent empirical observations prove other-
wise. The number of movers rapidly declines with distance while there is a
positive correlation between distance moved and city size. I build a general
equilibrium model of a system of cities to explain the city-size distribution as
a result of imperfect mobility. Consumers’ logarithmic perception of distance
makes the city-size distribution heavy tailed. I also extrapolate how toler-
ant residents are to distance in each US city from the data on city size and
interurban migration.
Keywords: geographic mobility, internal migration, city-size distribution
JEL classification: J61, R12
1 Introduction
1.1 Consumers Are Not Footloose
Labor mobility exhibits distinct geographic patterns. There is a log linear rela-
tionship between the number of incoming residents and their distance moved as
*Department of Economics, Concordia University, and CIREQ. Address: 1455 boul. de Maison-
neuve O, Montréal (Québec) H3G 1M8. E-mail: axel.watanabe@concordia.ca. I am grateful
for valuable inputs from Editor Jan Brueckner, two anonymous referees, Xintong Han and Pros-
per Dovonon. This work was supported by Soutien à la recherche pour la relève professorale,
2021-NP-282155, of Le Fonds de recherche du Québec – Société et culture. The usual disclaimer
applies.
1
can be seen in figure 1. An exceeding share of domestic migration occurs within
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Figure 1. Number of in-migrants to St.
Louis by distance. Colors and dots are
size proportionate. Two lines represent
ordinary least squares regression. Black
line includes Alaska and Hawaii. Gray
line does not. ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ denote coefficient
significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
a close proximity and there are only a
few who move coast to coast. Take St.
Louis for example. The vast majority
of incoming residents are from Missouri
and Illinois when in fact workers are
free to move anywhere in the country.
The inflow drops at an exponential rate
with distance. When the distance in-
creases by 1%, the inflow from that area
drops by 1%.
The city-size distribution is a result
of household relocation. Any city size is
the sum of the inflows into, less the out-
flows out of, the city over time. It is then
logical to speculate that mobility weighs
in on its determination. It is known that
the city-size distribution has a heavy tail
(cf. figure 2(c), Gabaix and Ioannides
[GI04], and Duranton [Dur07]). Inter-
city migration itself has a heavy tail as
well, from which the city-size distribution is derived (compare figure 2(b) to fig-
ure 2(d)).
Models of the city-size distribution traditionally assume perfect mobility. Work-
ers move to another city in direct response to local economic conditions regardless
of how far their destination is. The resulting city-size distribution is independent
of where workers were in the period before.
This paper aims to explain the city-size distribution as a result of the observed
intercity migration patterns above. In a general equilibrium model of a system of
cities, workers draw their type and tolerance level for relocation. They make their
location choices based on their type and how far they were born from their des-
tination city. The equilibrium city size depends on their attitude towards reloca-
tion. Empirical estimations reveal that workers perceive distance on a logarithmic
scale. Consequently, the majority of cities source their residents only from within
its immediate vicinity and thus remain small. However, there are certain types of
workers who do not mind moving far in favor of earning opportunities in a large
city. These types are rare but most of them will come to the city because distance
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(b) Probability density function of figure 2(a).
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(c) Size distribution of core-based statistical areas.
10
4
10
5
10
6
10
7
city size
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
fr
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
T
u
s
c
a
lo
o
s
a
, A
L
C
a
rs
o
n
 C
ity
, N
V
N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
-N
e
w
a
rk
-J
e
rs
e
y
 C
ity
, N
Y
-N
J
-P
A
S
t. L
o
u
is
, M
O
-IL
(d) Probability density function of figure 2(c).
Figure 2. Data source: US Census Bureau, 2009-2013 American Community Survey. Colors
and dots are size proportionate.
plays only a limited part in their location decision. Consequently, the city gathers
workers from across the country and becomes gravitationally large. The resultant
city-size distribution features a large number of small cities made up of nearby
in-migrants, paired with a small number of exceptionally large cities filled with
globally oriented workers.
1.2 Related Literature
Geographic mobility literature theorises about the probability of internal migra-
tion as a function of associated net gains (e.g., Sjaastad [Sja62] or Harris and
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Todaro [HT70]). Various factors involved in relocation choice have been studied
(see Molloy et al. [MSW11]). Davis and Dingel [DD12] and Rauch [Rau13] spec-
ulate on the heterogeneous search behavior by workers of different skill levels as
a possible cause. Falck et al. [FHLS12] turn to regional and cultural factors. They
document Germans’ reluctance to move outside of their shared area of regional
dialect. Woodard [Woo11] suggests similar cultural divides in the US.
On the empirical side, the primary focus is on whether a consumer moves or
not, but not on by how far he moves. In Bowles [Bow70], there are two distances:
whether a consumer is in the South or not. In Ladinsky [Lad67], there are four.
I measure the distance between every pair of 381 metropolitan statistical areas
(MSA), totalling 72,390 distinct distances, which enables me to examine the exact
role that distance plays. Haag et al. [HMP+92] feature the city-to-city distance in
France as well. Their work differs from the current paper as they work with a re-
duced form. Moreover, the literature concerns about the identification of relevant
causes for relocation, but not necessarily about the resulting city-size distribution.
By contrast, the city-size distribution has been one of the primary areas of
focus in urban economics.
Urban economics usually assumes no relocation cost (cf. Starrett [Sta78], and
Boyd and Conley [BC97]), and in labor economics, relocation cost is usually a
fixed cost that does not depend on the distance moved. For instance, in Manning
[Man10] and Hirsch et al. [HJO16], market imperfections lead to reduced mobility
in terms of type-matched industry, but not geographic mismatch.
The present paper is based on the works of Behrens et al. [BDRN14] and Eeck-
hout et al. [EPS14]. Behrens et al. show that workers sort into a city and select their
occupation according to their skill level. Along with skill levels, location-variant
serendipity determines the productivity and in turn the degree of agglomeration
in each city. Eeckhout et al. find evidence in support of extreme skill complemen-
tarity where the co-presence of workers from top- and bottom-tier skill levels does
not undermine but rather enhances their productivity. Migration in the present
paper is also motivated by heterogeneous skills. However, urban productivity is
simplified in the interest of incorporating distance-dependent relocation costs.
A myriad of socioeconomic and political factors are involved in the determi-
nation of city size. Considering that the city-size distribution is the upshot of
these individual cities that are already convoluted in and of themselves, it is un-
likely that one factor can single-handedly explain it all. Urban economists pick
one factor of interest and examine its explanatory power such as random growth
(Eeckhout [Eec04]), transportation cost (Berliant and Watanabe [BW18]) or col-
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lective decision (Duranton and Puga [DP19]) while keeping other factors such
as imperfect mobility turned off. Here, I will tune in to imperfect mobility and
tune out other factors. The ultimate model of the city-size distribution is likely
an amalgam of all these models. I intend to add a model with a yet unexplored
perspective to the pool of existing models that, when combined, yield a compre-
hensive description of the subject.
1.3 Reasons for Imperfect Mobility
There are many reasons for imperfect geographic mobility. For example, the ge-
ographic extent of job search expands with the level of skill. Ph.D students on
the job market fly everywhere for interviews, whereas it is not likely to see high
school graduates doing the same. According to the US Census, 35% of degree
holders moved for employment reasons whereas that of non high school gradu-
ates is only 13%.1 The same goes for the receiving end (cities) as well. 30% of the
residents in the 100 largest core-based statistical areas hold BA or Ph.D, whereas
that of the smallest 100 is 19%.
Along with the heterogeneous skill levels, uncertainty aversion may deter
long-distance relocation. It is usually difficult to know the quality of life in a new
city in advance. Furthermore, even if a worker herself may be mobile per se, it is
prohibitively costly to move the entire network of people she meets in her daily
life. The pecuniary cost of relocation is a one-time expense, but out-of-towners
may incur implicit costs as above over a long period of time, be it personal, social,
cultural or economic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the upcoming section I will lay
out the model and uncover the relationship among distance, inflow and city size.
I will empirically validate my theoretical predictions in sections 3 and 4, interpret
them in section 5, and summarize them in section 6.
1Data source: https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/demo/geographic-mobility/
cps-2015.html.
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2 Model
2.1 Landscape
Consider a closed production economy. I take the country to be a circle with
its perimeter normalized to 1 in order to remove the border that may otherwise
produce an unwanted asymmetric result. Cities line up along the perimeter X .
There are I of them indexed by i.
The model rolls out in two stages. Initially, there are N (∈ R+) consumers
uniformly distributed over X . Each consumer is endowed with a pair (t, 2) ∈
{1, · · · , T}×Y (⊆ N×R). The first entry is type t representing her skill. It identifies
her best suited industry to work in. There are nt of type-t consumers. Along
with the type, she also draws her distance-tolerance factor 2 from the distribution
with probability density function (pdf) ft(2) and cumulative distribution function
(CDF) Ft(2). A high 2 implies that she does not mind moving far. Note that∫
Y
ft(2)d2= nt for all t, totaling up to
∑
t
∫
Y
ft(2)d2= N nationwide.
Type distribution ft(2)may depend not only on t but also on birthplace. How-
ever, since consumers cannot choose a place to be born in,2 it is safe to assume
that ft(2) takes the same form regardless of the location.
In the second stage, consumers of type t make simultaneous and uncoordi-
nated decisions on their location. A type-t consumer can either stay at her initial
location or move to the city that matches her type. Following the example of Eeck-
hout [Eec04], each city i produces one commodity ci. For simplicity, I assume that
there are as many cities as there are types, that is, I = T . From here on I refer to
type t by its corresponding city i and use the term “city”, “type” and “industry”
interchangeably where applicable.
I write x i(∈ X ) to mark the birthplace of a type-i consumer measured by the
shorter arc length from city i. If I place this country on a compass with city i
facing the east, x i =
1
4
is found on the north or south and x i =
1
2
is on the west end
of the country.
2.2 Consumption and Location Choice
Consider a type-i consumer born distance x i away from city i. Her preferences
over a numéraire composite consumption good ci and housing hi are represented
2I will discuss the possibility of intergenerational dependence over space in appendix A.1.
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by
u(ci, hi) = ci +η log hi, (1)
where η measures the portion of her expenditure on housing. She is endowed
with a unit of time, which she converts into ci to earn wage 4i. Her budget
constraint is
4i ≥ ci + pihi +ρ(x i, 2), (2)
where ρ(·) measures the lifelong opportunity cost of relocation as discussed in
section 1.3. I will make following assumptions regarding ρ(·):
Assumption 2.1 Logarithmic Perception of Distance:
For any given 2 ∈ Y , the opportunity cost of relocation ρ(·) satisfies
ρ(0, 2) = 0, (3)
∂ ρ(x i, 2)
∂ x i
> 0, and (4)
∂ 2ρ(x i, 2)
∂ x2
i
< 0 (5)
over X .
Consumers’ nonlinear perception of distance gives grounds for (5). A St. Louis
native finds a move from St. Louis to Chicago more draining than a move from
Fairbanks to Anchorage (roughly the same distance apart). The additional cost
increase wears out with distance.
Coupled with assumption 2.1, I also assume that ∂ ρ(x i, 2)/∂ 2 < 0, i.e., the
higher the distance tolerance is, the lower the relocation cost will be.
In addition to finding the optimal consumption bundle, she also needs to de-
cide whether she will move to city i or stay put at x i. I will denote her decision
by a location choice function 1i(x i, 2) : X × Y → {0, 1}. If she drew (x i, 2) and
decides to move out of her birthplace, 1i(x i, 2) = 1. Otherwise, 1i(x i, 2) = 0.
2.3 Feasibility
Given the location choice function, a measure of type-i residents in city i is
si =
∫
X
∫
Y
1i(x i, 2) dFi(2)d x i. (6)
Let H denote the housing supply in each city. Using (6), define the feasible allo-
cation in this economy as follows:
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Definition 2.2 Feasible Allocation:
An allocation is a list of functions [ci(x i, 2), hi(x i, 2), 1i(x i, 2)]
I
i=1
with ci : X × Y →
R+, hi : X ×Y → R+, location choice 1i : X ×Y → {0, 1}, and output (zi)
I
i=1
∈ RI
+
. Given
type-size distribution (ni)
I
i=1
and distance-tolerance distribution [ fi(2)]
I
i=1
, an allocation
is feasible if
sizi =
∫
X
∫
Y
1i(x i, 2) ci(x i, 2)dFi(2)d x , (7)
H =
∫
X
∫
Y
1i(x i, 2) hi(x i, 2)dFi(2)d x , and (8)
si ≤ ni
for any i, where si is defined by (6).
2.4 Production
Turning to production, as mentioned earlier, workers supply one unit of (perfectly
inelastic) labor to produce the composite goods with a constant returns to scale
technology: τ units of labor produces zi = Ai(si)τ units of composite goods. Con-
trary to what is conventionally assumed, Ai(si) does not vary with industry i or
city size si (unless it is zero). In particular
A(si) =
(
1 if si = 0
a(> 1) if si > 0.
(9)
In the current model, I do not rely on productivity differences to break the oth-
erwise uniform distribution of workers. I shut off the channel through which
productivity differences bring in variations in city sizes (as documented in Rosen-
thal and Strange [RS04]) in order to isolate the role that distance tolerance plays
(or else I will not be able to tell how much of the size difference is the result of im-
perfect mobility). However, I still do need to secure some incentive for residents
to clump together in one location. Absent economies of localization, no one will
move to a city (cf. Glaeser et al. [GKS01]). Specification (9) is the minimally inva-
sive way to do so without introducing added complications from type-dependent
productivity.
Firms are a price taker and earn zero profit in equilibrium. Thus, each worker
earns
4i = a. (10)
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2.5 Rural Residents
Let us turn to a resident who stays put. He becomes a Robinson Crusoe-type
rural resident to lead a life under the backyard capitalism. His marginal product
gets pushed back to A(si = 0) = 1(< a) according to (9), housing consumption
becomes independent of the city size, and the cost of relocation becomes zero.3
I mark his maximized utility level by 3i, which, by construction, is independent
of x i. In order to keep the model on point, assume that the land in the rural
area is abundant enough and the number of people who do not move out of the
birthplace will not affect the value of 3i. Furthermore, assume 3i = 3 for all i in
order to remove arbitrariness.
2.6 Trans-Tolerance Value
Circling back to a consumer who leaves her birthplace, her indirect utility function
is
3 (pi, 4i; x i, 2, si) = 4i −ρ(x i, 2)−η+η (logη− log pi) . (11)
The housing market (8) clears when
sihi = H, (12)
from which I obtain the equilibrium rent
pi =
ηsi
H
, (13)
i.e, the more crowded the city becomes, the more expensive the rent per unit will
be.4 Firm’s first-order condition (10) and housing market clearance (12) further
simplify her indirect utility function (11) to
3 (a, x i, 2, si) = a−ρ(x i, 2) +η(− log si + log H − 1). (14)
The farther she is from, the lower her utility level will be, holding everything else
constant. Notice the trade-off among the economies of agglomeration a, disec-
onomies of agglomeration −η log si and distance tolerance 2. Holding the value of
3Location x i is identified by the distance from city i, which itself is located at x i = 0. For a non-
mover, the distance moved is x i − x i rather than mover’s x i − 0 so that ρ(x i − x i , 2) = 0 following
(3).
4Note that the expenditure on housing is always pihi = η regardless of the city size. A city resi-
dent copes with an increasing city size by reducing her lot size without changing her expenditure
share of housing.
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3i(·) constant, if the destination city becomes crowded or the productivity boost a
gets smaller, the only residents with high enough tolerance 2 would move to the
city.
Let us revisit the location choice 1i(x i, 2). A type-i consumer will move to her
type-matched city if her utility level (14) is greater than the fallback value 3 :
3 (a, x i, 2, si) = a−ρ(x i, 2) +η(− log si + log H − 1)≥ 3. (15)
A resident at the margin meets (15) with equality. Since ρ(·, 2) is strictly monotone
decreasing in 2, one can solve (15) with equality for 2 to define a trans-tolerance
function
2i(x i) ··= ρ
−1

x i, a+η(− log si + log H − 1)− 3

. (16)
This establishes the following:
Proposition 2.1 Location Choice Rule
A consumer who drew (x i, 2) makes her location choices 1i(·) in reference to the trans-
tolerance value 2i(x i) prevalent at her birthplace x i as follows:
1i(x i, 2) =
¨
0 if 2≤ 2i(x i) ··= ρ
−1

x i, a+η(− log si + log H − 1)− 3

1 otherwise.
(17)
A couple of observations on (16) and (17) are in order. First off, 2i(x i) deter-
mines the fraction of people moving to city i. Anyone who drew 2≥ 2i(x i) moves
out because she does not show much affinity to her birthplace or her opportunity
cost of staying put is too high. On the contrary, anyone with 2≤ 2i(x i) has a lot to
lose by relocation and thus stays in. Therefore, the higher the trans-tolerance is,
the higher the ratio of non-movers will be.
Second, 2i(x i) is increasing in x i because ρ(·) is increasing in x i. In the vicinity
of city i, the number of non-movers is very small because it does not take much to
turn residents into a city dweller. As a result, the borderline tolerance is very low.
As the distance to city i increases, the cost of relocation bears down on consumers.
They will not become a city resident as easily as before unless their tolerance is
high, making the threshold high as well.
However, since ρ−1(·) is concave in x i, the effect of increasing trans-tolerance
value becomes less pronounced as x i increases:
Proposition 2.2 Trans-Tolerance Function Is Concave
Suppose that the opportunity cost of relocation ρ(x i, 2) is concave in x i. Then trans-
tolerance function 2i(x i) is concave in x i as well.
10
Proof. Immediate from (16). 
The proposition hinges on assumption 2.1 that consumers perceive distance
on a logarithmic scale. I will validate this supposition in section 4.
There are in fact two ways to go about the trans-tolerance value. One is to
assume that the trans-tolerance function is identical over type: 2i(x i) = 2(x i) for
all i. The other is to allow 2i(x i) to take different values depending on the type. I
will explain the difference between them below.
(a) Type-independent trans-tolerance with
type-dependent distribution of 2.
(b) Type-dependent trans-tolerance with
type-independent distribution of 2.
Figure 3. Two possible specifications for the distribution of distance-tolerance value and
the trans-tolerance function at some location x i = x j = x ∈ X . The shaded area represents
a measure of workers who move distance x to live in their type-matched city i (in blue
and green) or j (in green). The remainder represents those who stay distance x away from
their type-matched city (i.e., non-movers). The outflow from location x i is larger than that
from location x j in both scenarios.
First suppose that 2i(x i) = 2 j(x j) = 2(x) for all i, j at any x i = x j = x ∈ X .
If 2i(x) will be the same across the types, then 2 should have been drawn from
different distributions depending on the type as in figure 3(a) (or else the city-
size distribution will be uniform). In this case, if fi(2) first-order stochastically
dominates f j(2), then si > s j (cf. proposition 2.3 below). Type i should be more
distance-tolerant than type j so that at any given x , more of type i must have
drawn 2 ≥ 2(x) than type j. In this case, 2 can be interpreted as a skill level
that indicates the favorable degree of concentration of workers. Industry j fea-
tures low-skill labor that does not benefit from concentration of workers within
the same industry. Consequently, their distance tolerance is drawn from the dis-
tribution with a low mean. By contrast, industry i involves a type of workers who
capitalize on large-scale interactions among them.
Alternatively, type can be thought of as a manifestation of risk tolerance. If
fi(2) first-order stochastically dominates f j(2), then type i is made up of those
who are willing to take on new challenges in an unfamiliar city. Large cities
are large because they attract adventurous types, who are ready to go through a
long-distance relocation process and consequently, the total inflow is large.
Now suppose instead that 2i(x) can differ from 2 j(x) at some x i = x j = x ∈ X
but 2 itself is drawn from the identical distribution f (2) regardless of the type as
in figure 3(b). In this case, if 2i(x) < 2 j(x), then si > s j. The variation in city size
arises directly from trans-tolerance (16) itself, rather than the distribution from
which 2 is drawn. City i has a larger influx of people because the net effect of
agglomeration a −η log si is large enough to make up for the fallback utility level
3. Once again, type i is likely to be a high-skill type whereas industry j does not
call for much concentration of workers.
Empirically speaking, I cannot tell which one is at work because I do not
have direct observations of fi(2) or ρ
−1(·). To cover all bases, I will consider
both type-dependent and -independent trans-tolerance for the empirical analy-
sis in sections 3 and 4. For the theoretical analysis to follow, I will take type-
independent trans-tolerance (figure 3(a)) as an example but the same argument
goes for figure 3(b) as well.
Most of the models of city-size distributions can be thought of as a limit-
ing case of the present model where trans-tolerance tends to negative infinity
(2i(x) → −∞) so that everyone moves out of their place of birth no matter how
far they are from their destination city. This can happen in a couple of different
ways. Looking at (16), if I remove the concept of distance, that is, if the distance
to the city is the same (typically zero in the literature) from anywhere, then no
one bears the cost of relocation ρ(0, ·) = 0 so that for sufficiently low 3 every-
one moves to the city and the size distribution turns uniform. Alternatively, if a
becomes dominant, everyone moves to their type-concordant city. The resulting
city-size distribution (si)
I
i=1
becomes the (exogenous) type distribution (ni)
I
i=1
it-
self. Existing models endogenously derive the city-size distribution using other
factors of choice than imperfect mobility to frame agglomeration (something more
complex than a rudimentary urban productivity defined in (9)).
Put differently, existing models start from stage two (and usually have more
steps to follow), whereas the current model focuses on the transition from stage
one to two.
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2.7 Competitive Equilibrium and City Size
Given the trans-tolerance function above, define
Definition 2.3 Competitive Equilibrium:
An equilibrium is a feasible allocation [ci(x i, 2), hi(x i, 2), 1i(x i, 2)]
I
i=1
and (zi)
I
i=1
, and
price system (pi)
I
i=1
∈ RI
+
, such that [ci(x i, 2), hi(x i, 2), 1i(x i, 2)]
I
i=1
maximizes the
utility level and (zi)
I
i=1
maximizes the profit under (pi)
I
i=1
for any (x i, 2) ∈ X × Y and
i ∈ {1, · · · , I}.
With the equilibrium conditions above, goods market (7) is written as
si =
1
a
∫
X
∫ ∞
2(x i)
{a−ρ(x i, 2)−η} dFi(2)d x i. (18)
Using the survival function Si(2) ··= 1− Fi(2), this further simplifies to
si = ni
∫
X
Si[2(x i)]d x i, (19)
from which the city-size distribution is derived.
2.8 Empirical Connection
I will reformulate theoretical predictions so far of city size and trans-tolerance in
preparation for empirical testing in sections 3 and 4.
2.8.1 City Size
I will differentiate distance-tolerance distributions by certain criteria to make
testable predictions out of (18). There are various ways to rank density func-
tions. I propose two of them below and discuss their implications for the city-size
distribution.
Proposition 2.3 First-Order Stochastic Dominance and City Size
If fi(·) first-order stochastically dominates f j(·), si ≥ s j in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that fi(·) first-order stochastically dominates f j(·). For any given
location x i = x j = x ∈ X , Si[2(x)] ≥ S j[2(x)]. Integrating both sides of the inequal-
ity over the country,
si = ni
∫
X
Si[2(x)]d x ≥ n j
∫
X
S j[2(x)]d x = s j (20)
from (19). 
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Remark. For the role of ni in (20), see appendix A.1.
In order to prepare a testable prediction, I will further specify a component of
city size (19) as follows:
niSi [2(x i)] = αi + βi x i. (21)
The left-hand side measures the inflow from location x i. Coefficient βi measures
the rate of decline in the inflow as a birthplace gets farther.
Proposition 2.4 Change in Inflow and City Size
Suppose that the inflow is linear in distance as in (21). Then the equilibrium city size is
si = αi +
1
4
βi. (22)
5
Proof. City size (19) implies si = ni
∫
X
Si[2(x i)]d x i =
∫
X
(αi + βi x i) d x i, from which
(22) is obtained. 
Remark. The slope βi reflects two items that appear in (18). First, it captures trans-
tolerance. If 2(x i) makes a rapid ascent with x i, then βi will be small because the
inflow will drop fast with distance. Second, it picks up the opportunity cost of
relocation. If ρ(x i, 2) does not flatten out with x i much, then again βi is small for
the same reason.
The remaining entries in (18) do not depend on the distance and thus are
picked up by αi rather. For instance, distance-tolerance distribution fi(2) does not
depend on x i and thus it will be folded into αi, which in turn measures type i’s
general distance tolerance or propensity to move out.
What applies to si goes for pi as well because it is proportional to si via (13).
Thus, if 2i has a high mean, then type-i consumers face a high rent in their city. An
increased rent functions as a repellent but type i has low enough 2(x i) to accept
it. Conversely, if 2 j has a low mean, p j will be low, but that will not be enough to
make up for their low distance tolerance and the city will be small.
2.8.2 Trans-Tolerance
Trans-tolerance is not observable but can be constructed from the recorded do-
mestic migration patterns.6 It is then useful to write trans-tolerance as a function
5The coefficients 1 and 14 in (22) do not carry much empirical meaning as they are an artifact
from having a circle of perimeter 1 for an economy.
6Note that (unobservable) 2(x i) determines (observable) mi(x i), not the other way around.
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of the inflow by distance. Let mi(x i) denote a measure of in-migrants to city i
from location x i.
Proposition 2.5 Inferred Trans-Tolerance
Suppose Fi(2) is strictly monotone increasing. In equilibrium, trans-tolerance can be
extrapolated from in-migration as follows:
2(x i) = S
−1
i

mi(x i)
ni

(23)
at any x i ∈ X .
Proof. From (19), mi(x i) ··= niSi[2(x i)] at any x i ∈ X . Since Fi(2) is strictly monotone
increasing, its survival function Si(2) is strictly monotone decreasing in 2. Thus,
for any given x i, 2(x i) = S
−1
i

mi(x i)
ni

. 
Sections 3 and 4 investigate the empirical validity of propositions 2.4 and 2.5
respectively, namely, section 3 estimates the size of cities whereas section 4 esti-
mates the type of cities.
3 Testing the Impact of Imperfect Mobility on City
Size
3.1 Data Employed
I use the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) 2009-2013.7
The questionnaire asks which MSA a responder lived a year prior to the survey. A
total of 381 MSA’s report in- and out-migration so that there are 381×380=144,780
entries of inflow and outflow recorded between each pair of cities.
I will make several adjustments to the data in order to test theoretical implica-
tions of section 2.
In theory, the initial distribution is uniform whereas in reality, all locations are
pre-populated with the number of consumers inherited from the previous period.
To make the initial distribution as close to a uniform distribution as possible and
eliminate the initial heterogeneity, I normalize the inflow by the total outflow from
the location of origin.
7Data available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2013/demo/
geographic-mobility/metro-to-metro-migration.html.
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The model features a circle. The maximum moving distance possible is .5
regardless of the destination. In contrast, the actual US stretches over a limited
expanse of land. The maximum distance differs city to city. Among 381 MSA’s,
Carson City, NV8 has the shortest maximum distance possible of 4,187 km, from
Bangor, ME. In turn, Honolulu and Bangor have the longest maximum distance
possible of 8,293 km, between each other. While the gap between the top and
bottom of the maximum range is mitigated by the fact that Alaska and Hawaii
are included, this may nevertheless contaminate the estimation results: I may
inadvertently underestimate Carson City’s size for the reasons other than distance
tolerance. Even if there were someone willing to move to the city from 8,293 km
away, that worker will not show up in the data because the country cuts off at
4,187 km in. I may overshoot Honolulu and Bangor’s size vice versa.
That said, I do not detect any systemic interaction between the maximum
range and city size in figure 4. The cap on the distance does not affect the city size.
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Figure 4. City size over maximum moving distance possible. Location of MSA, be it near
the center or border of the country, has no statistically significant bearing on its size. ∗∗∗
denotes coefficient significant at 1%.
While the longest cutoff is about twice as long as the shortest cutoff, consumers
perceive the distance on a logarithmic scale. The perceived gap is thus much
smaller than twofold as a linear scale implies. I will nevertheless regress city size
on inflow and the maximum range in section 3.2. The latter captures the said
8Coincidentally, Carson City was also the smallest MSA in 2013.
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non-economic constraints so that the coefficient on the former will not be watered
down by their presence.
I will validate proposition 2.4 in section 3.2 and then back it up with a different
type of regression in section 3.3 for robustness.
3.2 Regression on Distance Elasticity of Inflow
Empirical testing of proposition 2.4 requires two rounds of estimations. First, I
regress the city size on its inflow over log x i and compute coefficient βi of log x i
as I did in figure 1, not only for St. Louis but for all 381 MSA’s. Then I further
regress city sizes on αi and βi thus obtained. To this end, I write (22) as
log si = γ0 + γ1αi + γ2βi
 
+γ3αiβi + γ4 log(maximum distance possiblei)

. (24)
Note that γ1 and γ2 are coefficients of αi and βi, which themselves are coefficients.
Since I take a log of x i and si, βi measures a percentage increase in size over a
1% increase in distance, i.e., the distance elasticity of inflow. It is more suited
for empirical use than the rate of decline in inflow by distance originally cited in
proposition 2.4.
I included the interactive term αiβi as a regressor. This product tends to be
high among large cities than among small cities. The maximum moving distance
possible is included as well.
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Figure 5. Projected city size over distance elasticity of inflow. Dot size and color are
proportional to city size.
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intercept αi βi αiβi log(maxx i) R
2 adjusted R2
coefficient 12.79∗∗∗ .2183∗∗∗ .3641 .3624
t-statistic 285.53 14.73
coefficient 11.22∗∗∗ -1.394∗∗∗ .1736 .1714
t-statistic 66.37 -8.92
coefficient 20.35∗∗∗ .9360∗∗∗ 6.914∗∗∗ .7000 .6985
t-statistic 55.15 25.76 20.58
coefficient 20.69∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 7.106∗∗∗ .1287∗∗∗ .7224 .7202
t-statistic 57.37 23.92 21.83 5.51
coefficient 12.61∗∗∗ .005915 1.196e-06 -.002637
t-statistic 5.17 .02
coefficient 7.054∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 6.525∗∗∗ .1462∗∗∗ 1.487∗∗∗ .7771 .7747
t-statistic 4.84 26.85 21.88 6.95 9.60
Table 1. The impact of the distance elasticity of inflow on city size. Reported values
represent γ’s in (24). ∗∗∗ denotes coefficient significant at 1%.
Table 1 and figure 5 report the results.
Table 1 presents empirical evidence for proposition 2.4. Coefficient αi has a
positive impact on city size as expected. It simply means that a type with a high
average propensity to move tends to create a large MSA. However, even after I
controlled for this size difference in MSA’s, the distance elasticity of inflow βi still
exerts a positive effect on the size. The city size indeed increases by as much as
6.5% when the distance elasticity of inflow grows by 1%. It would have been 0%
if distance moved did not depend on city size. A city is large not only because it
is a destination for a large fraction of out-migrants but also because the number
of its in-migrants declines only gradually with distance. This attests to the strong
presence of heterogeneity among consumers by type. Hence, perfect mobility is
statistically unlikely.
The product of the two regressors above, αiβi, also influences the city size.
Even when a city can attract many residents nearby, if there is no sustained inflow
from around the country, the city will not be large. Conversely, even when a
city has a constant inflow of residents over X , if its potential movers have a low
propensity to move out, then the city will not be large either. This applies in
particular to four MSA’s in Alaska and Hawaii as I will discuss below.
As figure 4 and table 1 show, the maximum moving distance possible per se
has virtually no impact on the city size. However, if two MSA’s have the same
distance elasticity of inflow, the one with the longer maximum distance possible
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will have a larger size, for the reason I explored in section 3.1. Thus, its inclusion
is deemed necessary to obtain an accurate reading of γ’s.
In figure 5, all four entries from Alaska and Hawaii cut below the expected
size. It is a systemic pattern that emerges from their geographic disposition rather
than for economic reasons. Given their size, these cities should have lower βi and
they would have if they were surrounded by other cities nearby. In reality, they
are surrounded by Canada or the Pacific, neither one of them provides an inflow.
Inevitably, βi cannot drop despite their size to account for distant inflows from the
lower 48. Namely, their distance elasticity of inflow is high because of distance
rather than inflow. Other MSA’s in remote locations suffer the same symptom as
well but to a lesser degree.
None of these would matter if one assumed perfect mobility. New York City
may be composed exclusively of people from New England or of California na-
tives, with no difference in its size in the end. In this case βi = 0 across the country
and the resultant city size si simply matches the exogenous type size ni. In con-
trast, the present model anticipates that New York City cannot have the size it has
unless it gathers workers 1) of distance tolerant type (high αi), and 2) from across
the country (high βi). ACS indicates that both regressors are markedly different
from 0 and exert a crucial influence on the development of MSA.
3.3 Regression on Moments
To assess the robustness of the findings in section 3.2, I will regress city size on
the moments of its inflow. A high αi translates to mi(x i) having a high mean and
a high βi translates to a high variance. If the findings in section 3.2 are valid, these
moments should have a positive effect on the size of the destination city as do αi
and βi.
Table 2 and figure 6 report the result, which is in lockstep with section 3.2.
When the mean or the standard deviation of inflow inflates by 1%, the destina-
tion’s size grows by .5% and .7% respectively. The findings indicates that the pdf
of distance tolerance flattens out and shifts to the right with the city size in line
with proposition 2.3. For any given x i, large cities have a higher mean of inflow
than small cities, which in turn implies that the former first-order stochastically
dominates the latter in 2 and thus has a high αi. In addition, as βi becomes higher,
the variance of inflow becomes larger as does the city size, which also supports
proposition 2.4. Note that if one assumes perfect mobility instead, the moments
of distance moved would be the same for any i and thus orthogonal to the city
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size, which is unlikely according to figure 6.
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Figure 6. City size over the mean and standard deviation of distance moved among
in-migrants. Colors and dots are size proportionate.
intercept mean standard deviation R2 adjusted R2
coefficient 7.365∗∗∗ .8059∗∗∗ .1079 .1056
t-statistic 9.39 6.77
coefficient 6.975∗∗∗ .8024∗∗∗ .4005 .3989
t-statistic 19.38 15.91
coefficient 3.988∗∗∗ .5123∗∗∗ .7487∗∗∗ .4423 .4394
t-statistic 6.02 5.32 15.05
Table 2. City size regressed on the mean and standard deviation of inflow. ∗∗∗ denotes
coefficient significant at 1%.
Four MSA’s in Alaska and Hawaii (two each in each state) have a high mean
and variance for their size. Their mi(·) does not take off until later because they
only have one city nearby (the one and only other MSA in the same state) and the
next hike in value needs to wait till they cross the Pacific or Canada. As in sec-
tion 3.2, this is largely a geographic artifact and it does not necessarily mean that
they gather high-skilled and/or distance-proof labor. Aside from them, among
large cities, Philadelphia and Riverside have roughly the same mean distance
moved. However, Philadelphia consists mostly of locally sourced labor, whereas
20
Riverside takes in workers of various origins.
While both of them are significant, table 2 indicates that the standard deviation
exerts more influence on city size than the mean does. The size responds more to
how diverse the locations of origin are than to how far people moved on average.
4 Estimation of City Types
Along with the impact of imperfect mobility in section 3, the present model fur-
ther makes predictions about the type of city. This section examines what each
MSA is composed of by way of trans-tolerance computed in proposition 2.5.
In the absence of direct observation, I assume that 2 follows the normal distri-
bution with mean µi and unit variance for expository purposes. (In practice, any
distribution that satisfies the assumption in proposition 2.5 will do). I set µi equal
to the log of the total inflow the destination receives, and shift it upwards by µ171
across the board so that the city of geometric mean size (Tuscaloosa, AL, 171st in
rank) will have a mean of zero. I ran kernel density estimation on inflow first to
filter out the noise.
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Figure 7. Estimated trans-tolerance 2i(x i) by MSA. At each x i , consumers with 2 above
2i(x i) are expected to move to MSA, and the ones below the line are likely to stay at their
birthplace x i . Line color and width are proportional to the total inflow into each MSA.
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rank remark MSA total inflow 2i
 
100

2i
 
101

2i
 
102

2i
 
103

2i
 
104

2i
 
105

1 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 244,099 -9.74 -6.14 -4.28 -2.89 -1.46 0.46
2 New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 228,599 -7.85 -5.89 -4.19 -2.85 -1.36 0.51
3 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 196,434 -9.73 -5.91 -4.04 -2.58 -1.04 0.89
4 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 178,510 -5.28 -4.30 -3.33 -2.39 -1.49 -0.60
5 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 172,896 -10.87 -7.06 -4.64 -2.66 -0.29 2.33
12 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 126,264 -9.49 -5.51 -3.24 -1.75 -0.22 2.05
34 St. Louis, MO-IL 52,944 -9.17 -5.56 -3.26 -1.28 0.70 2.85
44 max range Urban Honolulu, HI 41,804 −∞ −∞ -4.32 -3.22 -0.13 5.95
95 1st quarter Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA 22,928 -6.87 -3.47 -1.65 -0.12 1.24 2.97
171 geometric mean Tuscaloosa, AL 11,911 -2.69 -1.64 -0.63 0.36 1.32 2.27
191 2nd quarter Sierra Vista-Douglas, AZ 10,576 -2.97 -1.92 -0.90 0.11 1.11 2.14
286 3rd quarter Albany, OR 5,658 −∞ -2.88 0.61 1.59 3.40 7.76
314 max range Bangor, ME 4,540 -5.01 -1.96 -0.26 1.22 2.56 4.10
366 min range and size Carson City, NV 3,062 -0.66 0.08 0.81 1.54 2.27 2.99
371 Bay City, MI 2,770 -5.78 -1.19 1.54 2.45 4.38 8.38
381 last quarter Lewiston, ID-WA 1,732 -1.79 -0.44 0.88 2.15 3.39 4.64
Table 3. Estimated trans-tolerance values of select MSA’s at x i = 10
0, · · · , 105. For
instance, a St. Louisan born 100 km away from St. Louis must have had the tolerance
value greater than 2St. Louis(100) = −3.26. Those who drew a value below −3.26 stay 100
km away from the city.
Figure 7 plots 2i(x) for all the destinations and table 3 lists 2i(x) for select
destinations at x = 100, 101, · · · , 105 km.9 All in all, large cities register lower
trans-tolerance values than small cities. Moreover, large MSA’s trans-tolerance
tends to take off more slowly than small MSA’s.
For instance, a resident x i = 10
3 km away from her type destination has to
have only 2 = −2.89 or above to move to Los Angeles, whereas that of Lewiston,
ID and WA needs to exceed 2.15. In other words, a mover with a tolerance level
of −1.46 could have been born as far as 104 km away from Los Angeles but the
same person has to have been born less than 10 km away from Lewiston. If 2i(x)
is assumed (and likely) to be negatively correlated with the skill level for instance,
then those who move to Los Angeles are more skilled than those who move to
Lewiston, ID and WA.
A slow rise in 2i(x i) among large MSA’s are most notable in Riverside, CA.
The city keeps picking up in-migrants well past 104 km, at which point the trans-
tolerance of other MSA’s such as Philadelphia starts to climb faster. Riverside
9Some destinations record −∞ in their immediate vicinity. These represent trans-tolerance
values for residents who were born only 100 or 101 km away from their type destination, which
are expectedly low. While x starts from 0 in theory, most MSA’s are more than 100 km apart from
each other. I do not have enough data density from which to extrapolate those residents’ accurate
trans-tolerance value. They are likely to be recorded as movers within the same MSA in practice.
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seems to attract workers from a wider range of locations for its size, in keeping
with the previous analysis in section 3.3. The opposite applies to small MSA’s,
whose in-migrants are locally sourced. Trans-tolerance of Bay City, MI makes a
steep ascent early on at around xBay City = 10
2. The majority of its incoming resi-
dents are from nearby Saginaw, followed by Midland, Flint, Lansing and Detroit,
all located in Michigan. Past these source locations, it becomes extremely unlikely
that a worker changes her residence to Bay City.
5 Interpretation of Results
Sections 3 and 4 have established the pivotal role that geographic mobility plays
in the determination of the city-size distribution. The city-size distribution simply
becomes uniform if one assumes perfect mobility in the current model.
Exactly what is it about imperfect mobility that gives the city-size distribu-
tion a heavy tail? To answer this question, let us revisit the assumptions about
f (x i), 2(x i) and ρ(·) made in section 2.7. I will let f (x i) pick up type differences
as before but the same argument goes for the other two as well.
City i is larger than city j because fi(·) first-order stochastically dominates f j(·)
from proposition 2.3. According to figure 3(a), the city-size distribution is heavy
tailed because the majority of types have its distance-tolerance CDF taking off
long before it reaches the trans-tolerance value. Thus, few people move out and
the resulting city size is small. However, there exist certain types whose CDF
starts to rise near or past the trans-tolerance value. While these types are very
rare, if a city happens to be of this type, then almost all of its potential workers do
move to the city, resulting in an explosively large population. Thus, large cities
are few and far between because 1) most people are distance intolerant but 2)
those who are tolerant will move to a select few cities with a high probability
regardless of how far their birthplace is.
One of the root causes behind a large skewness of the empirical city-size dis-
tribution is found in assumption 2.1. If people perceive distance linearly, the
trans-tolerance value climbs at a constant rate and cities will come uniform in
size. On the contrary, the robust empirical evidence so far indicates that a linear
scale cannot explain the observed migration patterns. People sense distance log-
arithmically. This leaves countering effects on small and large cities: For a small
city, the source area of in-migrants is restricted to a very short radius. The differ-
ence between 100 km and 110 km appears as large as the one between 10,000 km
and 11,000 km to them. For a large city, if it is attractive enough or its incoming
residents are tolerant enough to push the source radius beyond a certain point,
distance plays barely any role in the location choice of workers born far from the
city. To them, in reverse, the difference between 10,000 km and 11,000 km appears
as small as the one between 100 km and 110 km. While the gap between the
absolute distance is 10 km over 1,000 km, the gap between the relative distance
is the same factor of 1.1 for both. It is the latter concept of distance that people
call on when making location choices. Consequently, the source area becomes
exponentially large, as does the city size itself. Limpert et al. [LSA01] suggest
that something of multiplicative (rather than additive) nature underlies many
economic phenomena. Workers’ tendency to gauge distance in relative (rather
than absolute) terms may be one of those fundamental causes that give rise to the
heavy-tailed city-size distribution.
6 Conclusion and Extensions
I examined the role that distance moved plays in determining the city-size distri-
bution. Each worker draws a distance tolerance level from the distribution unique
to her type. She then makes a decision on whether to stay put or move to a city
to tap into urban productivity that the city has to offer. She compares urban pro-
ductivity with an urban housing market, a fallback value of her utility level when
she stays and, exclusive to the current model, how far the city is from her birth-
place when making location choices. The city-size distribution arises as a result
of factors specific to each industry and city, which determine how many people
move to the city and how far they move.
I regressed the city size on several aspects of the underlying distribution of
distance tolerance. The empirical data are in accordance with the predictions from
the model. The majority of types are distance intolerant. They gather only in small
numbers as most of them prefer to stay at their birthplace unless they happened
to be born close to the city. Then there are a very few but noticeable types who
are willing to move. They gather in large numbers to create gravitationally large
cities as most of them will move to the city regardless of where they were born.
The data also reveal that consumers recognize distance on a logarithmic scale,
which cements the heavy tail of the city-size distribution.
I assumed that each city hosts at most one type. Actual cities host multiple
types. Assuming co-location of different types in the same way as Eeckhout et al.
24
[EPS14] would yield a finer result than above, provided that relocation data are
recorded by industry. I do not know of such data.
In order to stay focused on the city size, I left urban productivity as plain
as possible. In reality, the distance moved may be correlated with in-migrants’
productivity, the aggregate of which defines the citywide productivity. It will
be useful to relax the current assumption on urban productivity and have the
distance moved explain it.
I assumed that each type knows where his type-matched city is. However, it is
not easy to know in advance where that city is located. Skill compatibility is not
fully understood until workers actually start working at their destination, which
may or may not be their right destination. One may introduce some uncertainty
in matching between type and industry.
A Appendix
A.1 Role of Type Distribution
Observe that the inequality (20) will be flipped if n j is sufficiently larger than
ni. That is, there is a trade-off between the distance-tolerance distribution and the
number of potential city residents. Even when type i is tolerant towards relocation
overall, its corresponding city size may be trumped by more intolerant type j if
type i is outnumbered by type j in the hinterland to begin with.
While the current model considers only two stages of decision making, the
time horizon can be extended to allow for intertemporal dependence of type. A
child of distance tolerant parents is likely to be born in his type-matched city
because there is a good chance that his parents have already moved to the city. If
the child’s type is same to his parent’s, a big city tends to seal its top-tier status
through this positive feedback loop (cf. Duranton [Dur07]). In this case, constant
ni will be replaced by νi(x i) with
∫
X
νi(x i)d x i = ni so that (18) becomes a law of
motion si, t+1 =
∫
X
νi(x i, t)Si[2(x i, t)]d x i, t , where the city size si, t+1 in the next period
is determined by the current distribution νi(x i, t) and size si, t .
In this case, νi(x i) works in the same way as fi[2(x i)]. While I made fi(·)
exogenous, it can be interpreted as what νi(x i) converges to in a steady state.
Or even within the life span of one worker, he may relocate a number of times
over the course of life. Because the cost of relocation ρ(·) is concave in distance
moved, relocation becomes less costly as the second relocation is less draining
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than the first. (To model this, one needs to forgo the assumption that a type forms
a one-to-one correspondence with an industry).
Both extensions will not counteract but only reinforce the result derived from
the current model. Thus, I will take the current model’s predictions as the most
conservative results and leave the extensions above for future research, which
should find a wider and more intense impact of imperfect mobility on the city-
size distribution.
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